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We construct an overlapping generations model in which parents vote on the 
tax rate that determines publicly provided education and offspring choose their 
effort  in  learning  activities.  The  technology  governing  the  accumulation  of 
human  capital  allows  these  decisions  to  be  strategic  complements.  In  the 
presence of coordination failure, indeterminacy and, possibly, growth cycles 
emerge. In the absence of coordination failure, the economy moves along a 
uniquely  determined  balanced  growth  path.  We  argue  that  such  structural 
differences  can  account  for  the  negative  correlation  between  volatility  and 
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1   Introduction 
A relatively recent line of thought has identified the significance of coordination problems 
for the process of economic growth and development.
1 The view that growth-promoting 
factors,  such  as  R&D,  physical  and  human  capital  accumulation  etc.,  are  endogenously 
determined by individuals who respond optimally to various characteristics of the socio-
economic environment, provides an idea on why coordination issues may prove important 
for the long-run development prospects: insofar as the actions by others affect a person’s 
economic  outcomes,  one  of  the  important  characteristics  that  may  affect  that  person’s 
decisions and actions is her reflection of how others will decide and act.  As it is well known 
from the seminal analysis of Cooper and John (1988), if individuals fail to coordinate their 
actions  in  an  environment  like  the  one  described  above,  then  multiple  Pareto-ranked 
equilibria may emerge. If these actions are determinants of growth-promoting activities, then 
coordination  failure  implies  that,  at  least  a  priori,  it  is  equally  likely  for  an  economy  to 
experience low or high growth prospects, depending on whether individuals are respectively 
pessimistic or optimistic when anticipating the actions of others. 
     The idea of multiple (low or high) growth paths evokes one of the most irrefutable facts 
of the world’s economic development experience: in terms of both levels and growth rates, 
the  world’s  per  capita  income  distribution  appears  to  be  polarised  and,  with  minor 
exceptions,  some  countries  are  permanently  trapped  in  the  lower  quartiles  of  this 
distribution.
2  Indeed,  some  authors  have  built  models  in  which  persistent  differences  in 
long-term macroeconomic performance are attributed to the multiple equilibria that arise 
when there are failures of coordinating actions that are strategic complements (e.g., Redding, 
1996; Palivos, 2001).
3 This line of research has, thus, sought to provide an explanation for 
the  persistent  differences  in  the  world  distribution  of  incomes  and  growth  rates,  which 
differs from the ‘path dependence’ hypothesis – a hypothesis that has been criticised on the 
                                                 
1 For example, see the survey by Hoff (2001). 
2 For relevant evidence, see Quah (1997) and Canova (2004) among others.   
3 Strategic complementarity “implies that an increase in the action of all agents expect agent i increases the 
marginal return to agent i’s action” (Cooper and John, 1988; p. 445). Hence agent i will respond by raising her 
activity level.   2 
basis that many industrialised countries did not happen to be rich at the initial stages of their 
development. Many of them were actually poor.
4 
     The  emergence  of  multiple  growth  equilibria,  due  to  a  combination  of  strategic 
complementarities  and  coordination  failures,  possesses  an  additional  explanatory  power 
when it comes to overall macroeconomic performance. In particular, it can also (partially) 
explain the incidence of growth volatility within an economy. In order to make the argument 
more  transparent,  consider  an  example  where  the  accumulation  of  a  growth  promoting 
factor depends on the actions of two distinct groups of agents. In addition, suppose that 
these actions are strategic complements. If these groups  fail to coordinate their actions, 
multiple equilibria may emerge depending of how each group expects the other to act. In a 
dynamic  setting,  as  this  process  continues  over  time,  there  is  nothing  to  preclude  the 
possibility that in some periods agents may choose actions associated with high growth while 
in other periods they may choose actions associated with low growth. Periods of strong 
economic activity may be followed by periods of weak economic activity and vice versa, 
depending  on  how  some agents  expect  others  to behave and  act.  Of  course,  this  is  an 
explanation  for  the  emergence  of  cycles  which  lies  on  structural  characteristics  of  the 
economic environment – particularly, the intrinsic uncertainty that pertains complementary 
decisions by distinct (groups of) individuals – and it, thus, differs from the ‘real business 
cycle’ literature which views fluctuations as a natural outcome associated with the extrinsic 
uncertainty caused by the presence of exogenous shocks.
5 
     The  contribution  of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  we  identify  a  new  type  of  strategic 
complementarity  and  coordination  failure  that  may  generate  multiple  growth  equilibria. 
Second, given that the manner through which agents coordinate their actions is a structural 
characteristic of the economic environment, we are able to provide a novel explanation for 
the negative correlation between output growth and its volatility. We do this by considering 
an additional scenario where such coordination failures are not prevalent. 
     Our  analysis  builds  upon  an  overlapping  generations  model  in  which  the  engine  of 
growth is the accumulation of human capital. The actions of both young (offspring) and 
adults (parents) affect the formation of human capital. In particular, the parents vote on the 
                                                 
4 Examples of path-dependent multiple equilibria are provided in the analyses of Azariadis and Drazen (1990), 
Galor and Zeira (1993), Ceroni (2001) and Chakraborty (2004) among others.  
5 A nice exposition of the ‘real business cycle’ literature and its fundamental ideas is provided by Stadler (1994).   3 
tax rate that determines the revenues available to the government for the provision of public 
education, while the offspring get greater benefits from publicly provided education when 
the effort they devote towards learning activities is relatively high. The technology governing 
the  evolution  of  human  capital  allows  these  decisions  to  be  strategic  complements. 
Specifically, the effort devoted by the young is an increasing function of the tax rate chosen 
by parents which, by itself, is an increasing function of the offspring’s learning effort. 
     We begin with a scenario in which these actions are subject to coordination failure. This 
is a case where multiple equilibria emerge, including a set of equilibria in which both cohorts 
choose no provision (i.e., no effort by offspring and a zero tax rate chosen by parents), and 
sets of equilibria entailing positive effort by the young and a positive tax rate as chosen by 
the adult voters. Subsequently, we consider a scenario in which the distinct actions of these 
two cohorts are not beset by failures of coordination – a scenario which results in a uniquely 
determined set of equilibrium choices. Given that the growth indeterminacy apparent in the 
former  scenario  is  inherently  linked  with  the  idea  of  growth  cycles,  we  undertake  a 
straightforward comparison between these two situations and find that the growth rate in 
the latter scenario is strictly higher that any of the multiple growth rates that could emerge in 
the former one. Consequently, we argue that there is a negative correlation between the 
growth rate of output and its volatility.
6    
     Our result on the link between volatility and growth, together with the mechanism that 
drives it, finds support from existing empirical evidence. Particularly, the influential empirical 
study of Ramey and Ramey (1995) finds a strong negative correlation between economic 
volatility and average GDP growth. They also find that government spending volatility is 
negatively, and significantly, associated with the growth rate of GDP.  
                                                 
6 A paper by Glomm and Ravikumar (1995) also shows that endogenously determined spending can result in 
equilibrium  indeterminacy  and,  possibly,  cycles.  However,  there  are  significant  differences  between  their 
analysis and ours. Firstly, the mechanism leading to their result is different as it rests on the ideas that, (i) the 
young generation’s education effort depends on the expectation of the future tax rate that will be chosen by the 
same generation when it becomes old, and (ii) the chosen tax rate depends on aggregate human capital due to 
the fact that the ‘warm glow’ argument in the utility function is introduced with CRRA coefficient which is 
different in comparison to the one attached to the remaining utility arguments; therefore, their result is not due 
to strategic complementarities in the decision making process of two distinct cohorts of agents. Put differently, 
we find multiple equilibria even with simple functional forms that imply uniqueness in their model. Secondly, 
when their parameter values allow multiple equilibria, they find an inverse relationship between the tax rate and 
income. In contrast, our model shows that the ‘high growth’ equilibrium actually corresponds to the relatively 
high tax rate. Finally, they do not examine the relationship between growth and volatility as we do in this paper.       4 
     The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the general set-up 
of our model. Section 3 solves and analyses the case with coordination failure while Section 
4 does the same for the cases where coordination failure is absent. In Section 5, we analyse 
and discuss the implications for the relationship between volatility and growth. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2   The Basic Structure 
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which time is discrete and indexed by 
t ∈￿. Each period, a cohort of unit mass is born. Agents within the cohort are identical and 
live for two periods. They are ‘young’ (or ‘offspring’) in the first period of their lifetime and 
‘old adults’ (or ‘parents’) in the second one.
7 The young are endowed with one unit of time 
which they can allocate between activities that augment their human capital (e.g., formal 
schooling) and leisure. The old are also endowed with a unit of time which, combined with 
their  human  capital  (determining  knowledge,  efficiency  and  expertise),  they  supply 
inelastically to firms in exchange for the prevailing market wage. Adults are also ‘voters’ in 
the sense that they cast a vote on their preferred marginal tax rate that the government 
imposes on their labour income. Their disposable income (i.e., the residual after taxation) 
finances their consumption. The revenues collected by the government are utilised so as to 
finance activities that support the qualitative characteristics of education (e.g., the quality of 
schools/colleges/universities,  scholarships,  research  and  teaching  support  etc.)  and, 
therefore, promote the formation of human capital. The government abides by a balanced-
budget rule each period.  
     There  is  single,  perishable  consumption  good  in  the  economy.  It  is  produced  and 
supplied by perfectly competitive firms who employ efficient labour so as to produce  t Y  
units of output according to  
  t t Y AH = ,    0 A > ,  (1) 
where  t H  is the aggregate stock of human capital. It also corresponds to the economy’s 
available units of efficient labour because agents (whose large population is normalised to 
                                                 
7  We  implicitly  assume  that,  just  like  an  amoeba,  each  adult  reproduces  asexually  and  gives  birth  to  one 
offspring.    5 
one) supply one unit of ‘raw’ time each. Profit maximisation implies that the equilibrium 
market wage per unit of (efficient) labour is constant at  t w A =   t ∀ .   
     An agent born in period t  enjoys utility over her whole lifetime according to   
  1 2 2 ln(1 ) ln( ) (1 )ln( ),    , (0,1)
t
t t t t u θ e ψ c θ ψ w h θ ψ + + + = − + + − − ∈ ,  (2) 
where  t e  denotes schooling effort when young and  1 t c +  denotes consumption when old.
8 We 
implicitly  assume  that  children’s  consumption  is  incorporated  into  the  consumption  of 
parents. The last term of the utility function indicates that parents are imperfectly altruistic 
towards their offspring. Specifically, a parent gets satisfaction by observing her offspring’s 
realised income. This is meant to capture the idea that parents care about their offspring’s 
future prospects and social status (both being enhanced through more advanced knowledge 
and/or increased income).      
     We assume that, when young, a person can pick up a fraction  (0,1) v ∈  of the existing 
(average) level of human capital  t H  without effort. This may happen, for example, through 
some type of home tutoring or by simple observation. The government provides goods and 
services that increase the potential human capital that a person can acquire. In particular, by 
providing one unit of output per young person, the government can increase her potential 
human capital by  0 φ >  units. Nevertheless, the young person must provide resources, which 
take the form of effort (or foregone leisure) in order to benefit from the government’s offer 
of education. Specifically, by devoting a fraction  t e  of her potential leisure time, she can 
assimilate a fraction  ( ) [0,1] t p e ∈  ( 0 p′ > ) of the publicly provided human capital. Denoting 
the public expenditures per person by  t g , our assumptions imply that human capital is 
formed according to  1 ( ) t t t t h vH φg p e + = + . Given that each young person has one unit of 
available time, the remaining analysis shall utilise the specific functional form  ( ) t t p e e = . 
Therefore,
9           
  1 t t t t h vH φg e + = + .  (3) 
                                                 
8 The superscript  t  on the left-hand side indicates the time of birth of the generation enjoying utility through 
this function. A similar notation applies to other functions below. 
9 This technology for the accumulation of human capital shares common features with de Gregorio and Kim 
(2000) and Ceroni (2001) among others. However, none of these have combined both effort (by offspring) and 
endogenously determined resources (by voters and the public sector) as complementary inputs within the same 
type of technology. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992, 1995) include both types of inputs in the formation of 
human capital, but they also assume that each input is essential for a positive stock of human capital.         6 
     The  government  finances  the  provision  of  goods  and  services  towards  education  by 
utilising its total revenues from labour income taxation  t t t τ w H .
10 Given that there is a unit 
mass of young agents, spending per person corresponds to  
  t t t t g τ w H = .  (4) 
     All adults are liable to income taxation. Therefore, they will meet their consumption 
needs out of their disposable income. Thus,      
  1 1 1 1 (1 ) t t t t c τ w h + + + + = − .  (5) 
     As indicated earlier, the electorate is comprised by the adults who cast a vote on their 
preferred tax rate. Therefore, the problem of an agent born it t  is to choose  t e ,  1 t c +  and  1 t τ +  
so as to maximise (2) subject to (3), (4) and (5), taking  t H ,  1 t H + ,  t w ,  1 t w +  and  2 t w +  as given. 
Equivalently, we can substitute (3)-(5) in (2) and write lifetime utility as  
 
1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
ln(1 ) ln[(1 ) ( )]
       (1 )ln[ ( )]
t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
u θ e ψ τ w vH φe τ w H
θ ψ w vH φe τ w H
+ +
+ + + + + +
= − + − +
+ − − +
.  (6) 
Now, the problem can be expressed as follows: the agent chooses  t e  and  1 t τ +  so as to 
maximise (2) subject to  0 1 t e ≤ ≤ ,  1 0 1 t τ + ≤ ≤  and taking  t H ,  1 t H + ,  t w ,  1 t w +  and  2 t w +  as 
given.  Of  course,  given  that  individuals  are  identical,  the  tax  rate  chosen  by  the 
representative  parent  is  the  one  that  will  prevail  in  a  democratic  regime.  Later,  it  shall 
become clear that the optimal choice for  t e  varies with the existing tax rate  t τ , while the 
choice  for  1 t τ +   varies  with  the  offspring’s  chosen  effort  1 t e + .  For  this  reason,  we  shall 




                                                 
10 We assume a linear effect for  t g  to guarantee an equilibrium with ongoing output growth. We could have 
assumed a more general specification  ( )
β
t t p e e =  (0 1 β < < ) for the effort element in the formation of human 
capital. However, doing so would render analytical solutions impossible (in the presence of the term  t vH ) 
without altering the qualitative nature of our results and their implications. Recall that when an agent chooses 
t e , she takes the effect of  t g  as given, because this term is determined by old agents. Therefore, we can 
consider  t t φg e   as  a  composite  input,  in  the  same  manner  as  we  do  for  efficient  labour  in  models  with 
endogenously  determined  accumulation  of  human  capital,  without  worrying  about  implications  of 
maximisation under increasing returns.      7 
3   Simultaneous Choices  
In this case, we can describe the dynamic equilibrium of the economy through  
 
Definition 1. Given an initial stock of human capital   0 0 h > , the economy’s dynamic equilibrium is 
determined by sequences of quantities  { } 1 1 0 , , , , , , t t t t t t t t c e Y g τ h H
∞
+ + =  and prices  { } 0 t t w
∞
=  such that, for 
0 t ≥ : 
(i)  the adults choose  t τ  so as to maximise utility, taking  t e  as given;  
(ii)  the young choose  t e  so as to maximise utility, taking  t τ  as given;  
(iii)  both cohorts take aggregate quantities and prices as given when maximising utility; 
(iv)  firms choose  t H  so as to maximise profits; 
(v)  t t h H = ; 
(vi)  the sequences { } 0 t t Y
∞
= , { } 1 0 t t h
∞
+ = , { } 0 t t g
∞
=  and { } 0 t t c
∞
=  are determined by (1), (3), (4) and 
(5) respectively.  
 
     It is straightforward to check that the FOC associated with the problem can be eventually 
written as  




t t t t t t
ψφτ w H θ
e
e vH φτ w H e
≥ ≥
− +





1 1 1 1 1 1
(1 )




t t t t t t
θ ψ φw H e ψ
τ
τ vH φτ w H e
+ + +
+




,  (8) 
with complementary slackness in both (7) and (8). Notice that we can use (8) to infer the tax 
rate that will be chosen by adults who were born in period  1 t −  (that is, the parents of 
agents born in period  t ). Solving (7) for  t e , (8) for  1 t τ + , expressing the latter one period 








      = −     +      
,  (9) 










      = − − −     −      
,  (10) 
where  / γ v φA = . Given that  , [0,1] t t τ e ∈ , we can summarise the solutions in (9) and (10) as  
 










,  (11) 
and 
 




e ψγ θ ψ
τ




.  (12) 
   
     These results merit some discussion. First of all, we see that corner solutions are possible 
and, as a result,  0 t t e τ = =  is an equilibrium. Evidently, this is due to the effect of the 
composite term γ  which stems, mainly, from the presence of the parameter v . The intuition 
is that, as long as  0 v > , the marginal utility has a finite upper bound for zero values of  t e  or 
t τ .  Therefore,  such  choices  are  possible  due  to  the  fact  that  utility  may  become 
monotonically decreasing in these arguments. Secondly, additional interior solutions with 
both  t e and  t τ being positive are possible as well, meaning that the model may actually admit 
multiple equilibria. The underlying cause of multiple equilibria in this framework can be 
clarified through 
 
Lemma 1. The choices made by parents and offspring are strategic complements.  
 
Proof. Using (9) and (10), it is straightforward to verify that  / t t e τ ∂ ∂  and  / t t τ e ∂ ∂  are both 
positive.   ■ 
    
     Our model is, thus, able to generate a type of strategic complementarities similar to that 
suggested by Cooper and John (1988). A higher activity by one cohort of agents induces the 
other cohort to increase its activity as well. Once more, the presence of the parameter  v  
(which implies a positive  γ ) is responsible for these effects. We can clearly see that when   9 
0 v =  ( 0 γ = ), both solutions become invariant to each other. The intuition is that, for  0 v = , 
the marginal utilities of both  t e  and  t τ  depend only on the relative weights of the utility 
arguments that they ultimately affect. When  0 v > , however, the marginal utility of  t e  ( t τ ) is 
increasing  in  t τ   ( t e ).  Following  increases  in  these  variables,  individuals  will  restore  the 
equilibrium  by  taking  the  appropriate  action  so  as  to  reduce  their  marginal  utility  – 
something they can do with an increase in  t e  ( t τ ) . In terms of intuition, a higher tax rate 
implies an increase in publicly provided education, therefore an increase in the benefits from 
devoting effort towards human capital accumulation. Similarly, a greater education effort by 
the young increases their parents’ marginal utility benefit of foregoing consumption and 
choosing a higher tax rate, a benefit that is due to the presence of the ‘warm-glow’ element 
in their preferences.   
     At this point, we shall derive the interior equilibrium of the model. Substitute (10) in (9) 
and manipulate algebraically to derive the quadratic equation  
 
2 2 2 (1 )( ) [ (1 )( )] 0 t t θ ψ θ ψ e γψ θ ψ ψ γθ e γψ − − + − + − − − + = ,  (13) 
whose solution is given by   
 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
(1 )( ) [ (1 )( )] 4 (1 )( )
2(1 )( )





γψ θ ψ ψ γθ γψ θ ψ ψ γθ γ θ ψ θ ψ ψ
e
θ ψ θ ψ
e
γψ θ ψ ψ γθ γψ θ ψ ψ γθ γ θ ψ θ ψ ψ
e
θ ψ θ ψ
 + − − − − + − − − − − − +
 =
− − + 
 = 

+ − − − + + − − − − − − +  =  − − + 
.(14) 
Similarly, we can substitute (9) in (10) so as to get the quadratic equation  
 
2 2 (1 ) [(1 )( ) ] (1 ) 0 t t θ ψτ θ ψ ψ γθ γψ τ γθ θ ψ − − − − + − + − − = ,  (15) 




(1 )( ) [(1 )( ) ] 4 (1 ) (1 )
2(1 )









θ ψ ψ γθ γψ θ ψ ψ γθ γψ γ θ ψ θ ψ θ
τ
θ ψ





− − + − + − − + − − − − −  =  − 
.(16) 
     The results in (14) and (16) show that it is possible to get interior equilibria in addition to 
the corner solution. We formalise this result with    10 
 
Proposition 1. As long as the roots of (13) and (15) are real, there exist three sets of pure strategy 
equilibria. These are {0,0}, { , } L L e τ  and { , } H H e τ  where, for  , x e τ = , it is  0 H L x x > > . 
 
Proof. Our previous analysis, together with  / 0 t t e τ ∂ ∂ >  and  / 0 t t τ e ∂ ∂ >  suffice as a formal 
proof.   ■ 
  
     Given the complexity of the solutions in (14) and (16), in conjunction with the already 
identified  importance  of  the  composite  term  γ ,  we  are  going  to  impose  a  parameter 
restriction that will allow us to characterise the interior solutions in an analytical manner but 
without diverging our focus from the presence and importance of multiple equilibria (and 
without any significant loss in terms of generality). In particular, for the remaining analysis 
we are going to assume that  1/3. θ ψ = =  Under this restriction, the reaction functions in (9) 
and (10) become  
 
1 1







            = − = −        
           
,  (17) 
















  = 
 + −  =
 

















  = 
 + −  =
 
,  (19) 
respectively. As long as  1/8 γ <  (henceforth, a condition that we assume to hold) these 
solutions satisfy 0 1 L H γ e e < < < <  and 0 1 L H γ τ τ < < < < .    11 
     The pure strategy equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1. It depicts the reaction curves, 
which are derived from equation (17). For  , t t e τ γ ≤  they move along the axes, while for 





     The next step of our analysis is to examine whether the multiplicity of equilibria rests 
upon the presence of a coordination failure in the decision making process by the young and 
the old. Formally, we can analyse this issue through 
 
Lemma 2. The three set of equilibria are ranked in the Pareto sense.  
 
Proof. Consider the utility of the old adult/parent during period t . Using (2), it can be written 
as 
 
1 1 ( , ) Ψ ln(1 ) ln( )
t t
t t t t t u e τ τ v ωτ e
− − = + − + + , 
where  ω φA =   and 
1
1 1 1 1 Ψ ln(1 ) 2ln[ ( )]
t
t t t t e AH v ωτ e
−
− − − − = − + + .  We  can  also  write  the 
utility of the young adult/offspring during period t  as 
  ( , ) Ξ ln(1 ) ln( )
t t
t t t t t u e τ e v ωτ e = + − + + , 
where  1 1 1 1 Ξ ln(1 ) 2ln[ ( )]
t
t t t t τ AH v ωτ e + + + + = − + + . Using the results in (18) and (19) we get 
 






+ − − −
− = − = , 
t e  
t τ   0   γ  
γ  
L τ   H τ  
L e  
H e    12 
 






+ − − −
− = − = , 
and  
 
2 2 (1 1 8 ) (1 1 8 )
, 
16 16
L L H H
γ γ
τ e τ e
− − + −
= = . 
Taking account of these results, and for given 
1 Ψ
t−  and  Ξ
t  (recall that for an individual 
agent, the aggregate stock of human capital is taken as given for any  0 t ≥ ), we can show 
that 
1 1 ( , ) ( , )
t t
H H L L u e τ u e τ
− − >  and  ( , ) ( , )
t t
H H L L u e τ u e τ >  as long as  
 
2 2 3 1 8 (1 1 8 ) 3 1 8 (1 1 8 )
ln ln ln ln
4 16 4 16
γ γ γ γ
v ω v ω
        + − − − − − + −
+ + < + +                        
, 




3 1 8 16 (1 1 8 )
3 1 8 16 (1 1 8 )
γ v ω γ
γ v ω γ
+ − + + −
<
− − + − −
. 
After some extensive algebra, the last expression reduces to  
  < 1/2, γ  
which  holds.  Thus, 
1 1 ( , ) ( , )
t t
H H L L u e τ u e τ
− − >   and  ( , ) ( , )
t t
H H L L u e τ u e τ >   hold 
simultaneously. With this result in mind, it is sufficient to show that 
1 1 ( , ) (0,0)
t t
L L u e τ u
− − >  
and  ( , ) (0,0)
t t
L L u e τ u >  so as to prove that the equilibria are Pareto ranked. Both these 
inequalities are satisfied as long as  
 
2 3 1 8 (1 1 8 )




    + − − −




3 1 8 16







holds. Some algebraic manipulation can reduce this expression to  
 
2 2 (1 6 ) (1 8 )(1 2 ) γ γ γ − > − − ⇒ 
 
3 0 32γ > − , 
which, of course, holds with a positive  γ . In conclusion,  (0,0) ( , ) ( , )
j j j
L L H H u u e τ u e τ < <  
for  1, j t t = −  and for every  0 t ≥ .   ■ 
   13 
     To complete the characterisation of the different equilibria, we need to address the issue 
of their stability. In other words, we need to consider whether small perturbations in the 
neighbourhood of each set of equilibrium choices will leave these choices unaffected or not. 
As it is known from the analysis of Cooper and John (1988), not all possible equilibria of a 
coordination game are unresponsive to such perturbations, as one of them may be locally 
unstable.  In  our  model,  such  an  equilibrium  is  represented  by  the  point  , { } L L e τ .  This 
becomes  evident  from  the  fact  that  / 0 L e γ ∂ ∂ >   and  / 0 L τ γ ∂ ∂ >   –  results  that  are 
completely at odds with the nature of the reaction functions in (17). If anything, we would 
expect that both cohorts choose lower values when the composite parameter term  γ  is 
higher, as they actually do at  , { } H H e τ . Thus, the point  , { } L L e τ  represents nothing else but a 
threshold which, in conjunction with agents’ expectations of how others will act, determines 
which of the two stable equilibria – i.e.,  {0,0} or  , { } H H e τ  –  will prevail. For example, 
consider that each cohort makes a choice x , where  , x e τ = . If one cohort expects the other 
to choose  L x x <  ( L x x > ), then it will choose 0 ( H x ). Anticipating this, the other cohort 
will choose 0 L x <  ( H L x x > ), thus verifying the initial expectation.
 11   
 
3.1   Indeterminacy and Growth Volatility 
As we have seen, when decisions by the young and the old within a given period are strategic 
complements, and in the presence of a coordination failure, the model can generate multiple 
equilibria. By itself, this is not such a surprising result for anyone who has some familiarity 
with  the  seminal  analysis  of  Cooper  and  John  (1988).  Nonetheless,  what  is  particularly 
interesting with our analysis is the idea of output growth indeterminacy that arises because 
any of the two sets of equilibria can prevail: for a given  t H , next period’s human capital 
(which, in equilibrium, satisfies  1 1 t t h H + + = ) can take more than one possible values. The 
reason why indeterminacy in the determination of variables that affect the accumulation of 
                                                 
11 Notice that this notion of instability differs from the one applied in variables that display an explicit dynamic 
pattern. More formally, let  ( ) t t e f τ = and  Φ( ) t t τ e =  denote the reaction function of the children and the 
parents, respectively, when  , 0. t t e τ >  A (Nash) equilibrium is said to be stable if, starting from any point in its 
neighbourhood, the adjustment process in which players take turns myopically playing a best response to each 
other’s current strategies converges to the equilibrium. This requires that 
1 (Φ ) , f
− ′ ′ <  which, using (17), is 
equivalent to  1/4. τ > Hence, { , } L L e τ is unstable and { , } H H e τ is stable.    14 
human  capital  and,  therefore,  economic  growth  may  prove  of  particular  importance  is 
twofold.  
     Firstly, our paper belongs to the strand of literature that explains the stylised fact of ‘club’ 
convergence, without resorting to the problematic scenario in which growth/development 
paths  depend  on  initial  conditions  or  endowments  –  problematic  in  the  sense  that  the 
suggestion that some countries are currently rich simply because they happened to be rich 
before  does  not  appear  to  be  historically  accurate.  Other  analyses  that  arrive  to  similar 
conclusions, but under different settings, are those of Redding (1996) and Palivos (2001). In 
the former, strategic complementarities between workers and entrepreneurs imply that, over 
some range of parameter values, multiple growth equilibria may emerge. In the latter, the 
complementarities  generated  by  the  existence  of  family-size  norms  imply  indeterminate 
fertility choices and, given the trade-off between child-rearing and educational attainment, 
multiple growth equilibria.  
     The second significant implication of indeterminacy is that the growth rate of output 
(which, given  t t h H = , corresponds to the growth rate of human capital) may not settle 
down to a balanced growth path, instead its behaviour may display a periodic pattern. This is 
because there is no intertemporal element in each cohort’s choices, as it is obvious from 
(17), therefore any equilibrium { } 0,0  or { } , H H e τ  may prevail during each distinct period 
[0, ) t ∈ ∞ . We can formalise this argument with  
 
Proposition 2. In the presence of strategic complementarities and coordination failure, the growth rate of 
output  may  not  be  balanced,  instead  it  may  be  volatile  as  it  is  given  by 
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ / / t t t t t t t η Y Y H H v ωe τ + + ≡ = = + , where  ˆ ˆ { , } {0,0}   t t e τ = or  ˆ ˆ { , } { , } t t H H e τ e τ = , for  0 t ≥ . 
 
Proof. The previous analysis suffices as a formal proof.   ■ 
    
     The idea of cyclical growth is absent from the analysis of Redding (1996) because he 
employs a framework in which the economy terminates at the end of the second period, 
implying that interactions among agents occur only once: consequently, multiple equilibria 
cannot be considered as a sign of periodic fluctuations in economic activity. In this respect, 
our framework shares more similarities with the analysis of Palivos (2001) in the sense that   15 
both employ full-fledged dynamic settings which allow interactions between agents to occur 
at  every  distinct  period.  Like  we  do  in  this  paper,  he  recognises  that  multiplicity  and 
indeterminacy are sources of growth cycles. In a framework which is closer to ours, Glomm 
and Ravikumar (1995) also discuss the possibility of cycles due to the presence of multiple 
equilibria. In their model, these arise (under some parameter specifications) because the 
future tax rate, which depends on future income, affects current education decisions which, 
partially, determine future income due to the accumulation of human capital.    
     Notwithstanding  these  common  equilibrium  implications,  our  particular  framework 
allows us to examine scenarios in which the choices between the two cohorts are sequential 
and entail some degree of commitment by one of them. This is something we do in the 
subsequent  part  of  our  paper.  As  we  shall  see  at  an  even  later  part,  a  straightforward 
comparison between these two scenarios will allow us to draw additional and important 
conclusions from our theoretical structure.   
 
4   Equilibrium with Commitment  
In this part, we are going to reconsider our problem when the assumption of simultaneous 
choices is relaxed. In particular, we shall assume that the old decide on the tax rate first and, 
following this announcement, the young decide on their education effort.
12 Effectively, we 
shall assume that adults act as ‘Stackelberg’ leaders. Formally, we can describe the model’s 
equilibrium through  
 
Definition 2. Given an initial stock of human capital   0 0 h > , the economy’s dynamic equilibrium is 
determined by sequences of quantities  { } 1 1 0 , , , , , , t t t t t t t t c e Y g τ h H
∞
+ + =  and prices  { } 0 t t w
∞
=  such that, for 
0 t ≥ : 
(i)  the adults choose  t τ  so as to maximise utility, taking account that the education effort by the 
young is related to their decision concerning taxation, i.e.,  ( ) t t e f τ = ;  
(ii)  parts (ii)-(vi) of Definition 1 hold.   
                                                 
12 We may think that this idea captures scenarios in which governments commit to the provision of a certain 
fraction of GDP or of tax revenue towards education spending. For example, Section 8 of Article XVI of the 
California  state  constitution,  added  by  Proposition  98  of  1988,  establishes  a  minimum  funding  level  or 
guarantee for K–12 education and community colleges. See, among others, Leyden 2005. 
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     Given the above, our approach to the problem entails that we solve the problem of a 
young person in t  so as to get her reaction function  ( ) t t e f τ = . The old adults of generation 
1 t −  will take account of this when choosing their preferred tax,  t τ￿ , therefore the optimal 
education choice by the young will be  ( ) t t e f τ = ￿ ￿ . 
     Following our preceding analysis, we still restrict our attention to  1/3 θ ψ = = . Using this 





t t t t t t
φτ w H
e vH φτ w H e
=
− +
.  (20) 











= −  
 
.  (21) 
     Our next step is to substitute (21) into the  1 t −  variant of the utility function in (2), i.e., 
after expressing it in terms of 
1 t u
− . Eventually, we get  
 
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 ln(1 ) ln[(1 ) ( )] ln ( )
2
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
w
e τ w vH φτ w H e vH φτ w H
+
− − − − − −
  − + − + + +    
.  (22) 





t t t t t
φw H
τ vH φτ w H
=
− +
.  (23) 








= ≡ ￿.  (24) 









= ≡   −  
￿.  (25) 
     As long as the previously imposed restriction  1/8 γ <  still applies (which we assume that 
it does), these solutions satisfy  1 γ τ < < ￿  and  1 γ e < < ￿  as required. Thus, we can present our 
next result in the form of  
   17 
Proposition 3. In the absence of coordination failure, the equilibrium is uniquely determined and the 
economy  moves  permanently  along  a  balanced  growth  path.  The  equilibrium  growth  rate  is  equal  to 
1 1 / / t t t t η Y Y H H v ωτe + + ≡ = = + ￿ ￿￿, for every  0 t ≥ . 
 
Proof. The analysis leading to the solutions in (24) and (25) suffices as a formal proof.   
 
     It is evident that, in this scenario, the possibility of growth cycles has disappeared. The 
reason  for  this  result  is  because  the  equilibrium  decisions  by  agents  are  now  uniquely 
determined. In terms of intuition, the intrinsic uncertainty that pertained choices when these 
were made simultaneously has vanished. The old understand that an increase in the tax rate 
increases the willingness of the young to forego part of their leisure activities, simply because 
the benefits from doing so are higher. Consequently, they decide the tax rate that will induce 
children to provide the relatively high education effort that will satisfy their parents.  
     Once more, this result is not surprising by itself. Nonetheless, when compared to the 
previous  scenario,  it  allows  us  to  identify  a  novel  fundamental  mechanism  for  the  link 
between volatility and growth. This is an issue to which we shall turn, after we examine what 
happens in a scenario where the offspring become ‘leaders’ and parents become ‘followers’ 
during the decision making process. 
 
4.1   Commitment by the Young 
Although this represents a less reasonable scenario, we shall briefly discuss the case where 
the young are the ones who commit to a certain effort towards learning activities. We do this 
purely  as  a  means  of  illustrating  the  robustness  of  our  main  results  to  the  different 
assumptions  concerning  the  ‘leaders’  and  ‘followers’  of  the  decision  making  process.  In 
terms  of  a  concrete  real-life  example,  we  may  think  of  scholarships  and/or  tuition  fee 
waivers that are provided on the basis of students’ success on achieving some performance 
targets.    18 
     In this case, when the young choose  t e , they take account that  Φ( ) t t τ e = . Based on this, 
they choose their optimal learning effort  t e ￿  which, subsequently, determines the chosen tax 
rate by adults through  Φ( ) t t τ e = ￿ ￿ .
13 
     We can write (6) in terms of 
1 t u
−  (using  1/3 θ ψ = = ), maximise with respect to  t τ  and 











= −  
 
.  (26) 








= ≡ ￿ ,  (27) 









= ≡   −  
￿.  (28) 
     The results in (27) and (28) indicate that the implication from Proposition 3 still applies, 
because the temporary equilibrium and, therefore, the growth rate of output are uniquely 
determined. In terms of intuition, the young understand that by foregoing some of their 
leisure will increase the adults’ utility benefit from foregoing part of their consumption, in 
order to support a higher tax rate. As a result, they devote the amount of learning effort that 
will provide adults with the incentive to choose relatively high public spending on education.           
     
5   Growth and Volatility 
In the preceding analysis, we have considered two cases concerning the sequence of events 
that governs the choices made by old adults/voters and young agents – choices that relate to 
and affect the accumulation of human capital. As such, they have significant implications for 
the growth rate of output in the economy. When choices are made simultaneously, multiple 
equilibria (i.e., indeterminacy) emerge. These imply that the actual growth rate may display 
fluctuations over time depending on how each cohort of agents expects the other to behave 
                                                 
13 The formal definition of the equilibrium is similar to Definition 2, the only difference being that part (i) 
should now read “the young choose  t e  so as to maximise utility, taking account that the tax rate chosen by adults is related to 
their decision concerning education effort, i.e.,  Φ( ) t t τ e = ”. 
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and act. When choices are made sequentially, the equilibrium is unique and, therefore, leads 
to a uniquely determined balanced growth path. 
     These results bring forth an important repercussion concerning the correlation between 
an economy’s periodic behaviour and its long-term macroeconomic performance. Despite 
the fact that some early economists conjectured that temporary and long-term movements in 
economic activity are inherently linked, it is only recently that a growing body of literature 
considered the analysis of the fundamentals behind this link as a research question worth 
pursuing.
14  This  strand  of  literature  was  further  stimulated  by  an  increasing  number  of 
empirical analyses (e.g., Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Martin and Rogers, 2000; Turnovsky and 
Chattopadhyay, 2003) showing that growth rates are significantly – and, mainly, inversely – 
correlated, on average, with proxies of their variability. Until recently, theoretical studies 
have explored this issue with the construction and solution of stochastic endogenous growth 
models  –  i.e.,  models  in  which  (extrinsic)  uncertainty  is  introduced  through  the 
incorporation of some RBC-type real and/or monetary shocks (e.g., Dotsey and Sarte, 2000; 
Varvarigos, 2007). These shocks have non-linear effects on the equilibrium growth rate, 
implying that their variability impinges on the average rate of output growth. 
     Our analysis can be viewed as providing an alternative suggestion – mainly, the idea that 
both differences in growth rates and the incidence of growth volatility are inherently linked 
to  the  structural  characteristics  of  the  economic  environment.  We  outline  the  main 
implication from this idea in  
 
Proposition 4. There is a negative correlation between volatility and growth, in the sense that the growth 
rate of the economy that may undergo cyclical fluctuations is strictly lower than the growth rate of the economy 
in which such fluctuations are absent. That is,  ˆt η η < ￿  t ∀ . 
 
Proof. Given our analysis and results so far, it suffices to show that  H H e τ eτ < ￿￿. It is  
 
2





  + − + − + −




                                                 
14 See Schumpeter (1934) and Kaldor (1954), among others, for some early ideas on the relationship between 
economic growth and cyclical fluctuations.     20 
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  −3 − −3
= =   −  
￿￿ . 
Then, for  H H e τ eτ < ￿￿ we want  
 
1 2 1 8 1 8 1
16 4
γ γ γ + − + − −3
< ⇒ 
 
2 1 8 1 4 4 γ γ γ − < − + , 
a condition that is indeed true. Therefore, we conclude that  ˆt η η < ￿.   ■ 
 
     Contrary to the existing literature, our model does not rely on exogenously introduced 
random shocks so as to generate growth cycles. Rather, it is the intrinsic uncertainty which is 
inherent in strategically complement decisions, when these are subjected to coordination 
failure, which is responsible for growth volatility.
15 When the structural characteristics of the 
economy  render  such  failures  absent,  growth  cycles  disappear  and  the  complementary 
actions by agents are conducive to the formation of human capital. Perhaps, it is because of 
this idea that our model, in comparison to the aforementioned literature, is able to make an 
even stronger claim: cyclical growth rates are not only lower on average, but also periodically 
(i.e., at any moment in time).  
 
6   Conclusions  
In the preceding analysis, we have sought to provide a novel explanation for the, empirically 
observed, negative correlation between volatility and growth. In particular, we argued that 
this may be due to the structural characteristics that govern choices by different cohorts of 
agents,  when  such  choices  are  strategic  complements  and  affect  the  accumulation  of  a 
growth promoting factor – in our case, human capital. Furthermore, our framework lies in 
the class of models that are able to explain convergence in ‘growth clubs’ without resorting 
                                                 
15 A recent contribution by Wang and Wen (2006) also examines the relationship between endogenously driven 
cycles  and  growth.  They  do  so  in  a  completely  different  setting  however.  In  their  model,  imperfectly 
competitive firms set prices one period in advance. Given that the decisions by firms within the industry are 
strategic complements, each one faces extrinsic uncertainty concerning its competitors’ actions – uncertainty 
which can be self-fulfilling and, thus, lead to sunspot equilibria. They show that, under certain parameter 
restrictions, the mean growth rate of an economy perturbed by sunspot shocks is lower than the growth rate of 
an economy in which sunspot shocks do not emerge.       
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to the idea of differences in initial conditions. In terms of policy implication, our analysis 
suggests that a credible policy of commitment towards growth promoting factors (such as 
education in our particular framework) could lead to both an increase in output growth and, 
as an added benefit, a reduction in the incidence of aggregate variability. 
     Our model is stylised in a manner that facilitates it in admitting analytical solutions. Yet, 
we do not view this as a shortcoming but rather as a vehicle that allows it to benefit from 
clarity of intuition and tight focus on the mechanisms involved during the materialisation of 
the basic results. Of course, we do not want to argue against the idea that more general 
specifications for preferences and technologies will provide a more complete picture of the 
issue at hand. What we firmly believe, however, is that the main mechanisms of our paper 
will survive even under the most general set-up. In any case, such a general, numerically 
solved, setting may constitute a worth pursuing avenue for future work.        
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